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Most of the literature which studies the evolutionary foundations of other-
regarding preferences adopts the indirect evolutionary approach (G￿th and
Yaari, 1992; G￿th, 1995; G￿th and Kliemt, 1998). While the standard ap-
proach in evolutionary game theory consists in investigating whether a strat-
egy is robust to evolutionary selection, the indirect evolutionary studies are
about whether certain preferences are evolutionarily successful. Suppose
there is a heterogeneous population composed of individuals with di⁄erent
preference types (e.g., altruistic and sel￿sh). From this pool, agents endowed
with their speci￿c preferences are recurrently and randomly drawn to play
a basic game with material payo⁄s (e.g., monetary payo⁄s). In each round,
players behave rationally, maximizing their expected utility associated to
their own preferences (which does not necessarily match the underlying ex-
pected material payo⁄). The evolutive success of a certain preference type
is evaluated on the basis of the material payo⁄s (objective ￿tness) induced
by the pro￿le of strategies adopted. Agents whose preferences lead to higher
material payo⁄s (higher ￿tness) tend to reproduce faster than those with
lower material payo⁄s (lower ￿tness).
It should be noted that the use of this methodology poses a potentially
di¢ cult problem. Indeed, while in the traditional approach individuals are
identi￿ed with strategies (each agent is programmed to play a speci￿c strat-
egy), in the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are identi￿ed with
preference types. Consequently, we need to choose a rule which maps pro-
￿les of preferences into behavior to evaluate the evolutive ￿tness of a certain
preference type, given the preference types of others. We can think of the
evolution of preferences as a two-speed dynamic process. There is a fast
adaptation process whereby, given the distribution of preference types in the
population and the information structure, players adjust their behavior until
they reach some plausible stationary state (equilibrium play). These states,
in turn, constitute the rounds of a slower evolutionary process along which
the population composition adjusts according to a ￿tness criterion. Thus,
the static solution concept which captures players￿behavior in any relevant
state of the evolutionary dynamics (when the distribution of preferences is
given) becomes crucial.
Existing studies in the literature on the evolution of preferences adopts
Nash equilibrium (or variants of it) as a rule to describe behavior in any
state of the evolutionary dynamics. A common feature of these studies is
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on the observability of the preference types of others. On one side, some
authors conclude that evolution favors non-sel￿sh preferences if players ob-
serve their opponents￿preference types at least to some degree. For example,
G￿th and Yaari (1992) argue that observability is the driving force for the
evolution of interdependent preferences (altruistic, reciprocal,...) by means
of a commitment e⁄ect. Bester and G￿th (1998) show that if the context ex-
hibits strategic complementarities and players can observe their opponent￿ s
preference type, natural selection favors altruism.1 Conversely, several other
authors conclude that if opponents￿preferences are not observable, evolu-
tionary forces favor preferences which coincide with the material payo⁄ (Ok
and Vega-Redondo, 2001). Similarly, Ely and Ylankaya (2001) show that if
preferences are unobservable, outcomes which are supported by stable pref-
erences distributions must be Nash equilibrium outcomes. These negative
results are emphasized by Samuelson (2001) and Robson and Samuelson
(2011). In particular, Samuelson (2001), in his introduction to the sym-
posium on the evolution of preferences, asserts: ￿these papers [i.e., Ok and
Vega-Redondo, 2001; Ely and Ylankaya, 2001] highlight the dependence of
indirect evolutionary models on observable preferences, posing a challenge
to the indirect evolutionary approach that can be met only by allowing the
question of preference observability to be endogenously determined within the
model￿(p. 228).
Dekel, Ely, and Ylankaya (2007) study the evolution of preferences by
means of a very general indirect evolutionary model and con￿rm the neces-
sity result of the previous works. As suggested by Samuelson (2001), they
also investigate its robustness. They assume that in each state of the long-
term dynamics, agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), given their
preferences and the information about others￿preferences. They show that,
if players know the distribution of preference types in the population but do
not observe their opponent￿ s preferences, any non-Nash equilibrium outcome
of the underlying game with ￿tness payo⁄s can be destabilized by a mutant
with materialistic preferences. They conclude that this result holds true even
if we allow for a small degree of observability.
Samuelson and Robson (2011), when commenting on the actual state
of the art of the literature on the evolution of preferences, conclude that
1For other results on the evolutionary success of non-sel￿sh preferences under observ-
ability of the preference types of others, see also Herold and Kuzmics (2008, 2009).
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an alternative description of the evolutionary process, one that is perhaps
less reminiscent of biological determinism, but leads to no new results￿(p.
234). They propose to change the evolutionary scenario so as to encompass
the evolution of signals of own preferences (and of reactions to these signals),
as suggested by Samuelson (2001). One thing is certain: if we do not want
to discard the indirect evolutionary approach, we need to overcome the strict
dependence of the evolutionary success of nonmaterialistic preferences on
observability.
In the next section, we present a new evolutionary scenario applied to
the Centipede Game. We show that by adopting the solution concept of
self-con￿rming equilibrium to capture the short-run play, there is room for
altruistic preferences to evolve even if preferences are unobservable.2 Before
going into the details of our model, it is worth discussing two preliminary
observations.
First, we want to stress that it is hard to justify the use of Nash equilib-
rium to capture the short-run play. In general, we can identify two possible
justi￿cations for a solution concept. The eductive interpretation (Binmore,
1987) assumes that the basic game is played only once and agents logically
derive and implement the solution. To justify a BNE play eductively, we
would have to assume rationality and common certainty of rationality, given
common knowledge of the (Bayesian) game.3 Yet, rather than implying in
general that a BNE is played, these assumptions naturally deliver the larger
set of (interim) rationalizable pro￿les of strategies for the given Bayesian
game.4 But even if they deliver only the unique BNE, they remain strong
2We pick altruistic preferences (joint material payo⁄ maximizing) for various reasons.
First, these altruistic preferences are a very simple form of other-regarding preferences and
constitute a clear alternative to sel￿sh preferences. Second, their evolution has already
been studied (Bester and G￿th, 1998). Third, in the context of the Centipede Game
described in the next section, a population of all altruists is evolutionary stable and induces
an (aggregate) outcome di⁄erent from the Nash equilibrium outcome of the basic game.
Since our main purpose is to show that we can ￿nd a stable distribution of preferences
which induce (stable) non-Nash behavior, to consider a general model with every possible
speci￿cation of preferences, as in Ely and Ylankaya (2001) and Dekel, Ely, and Ylankaya
(2007), goes beyond the scope of this paper.
3By "knowledge" we mean a true, justi￿ed belief based on observation and deduction
while, by "certainty" we mean a probability-one belief.
4On interim rationalizability, see Ely and Pesky (2006), Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2007) and Battigalli et al. (2008).
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in each state of the evolutionary dynamics is the result of an adaptation
process (adaptive interpretation),5 we would need to be more explicit about
the learning dynamics to show that the play surely converges to some BNE.
In particular, we would have to specify what players can observe regarding
the outcomes of previous interactions in order to explain how they could
end up in equilibrium, holding a common and correct belief about the play
(whatever their preferences). For example, in static games a player can learn
the correct probabilities of each of his opponents￿actions by observing only
the actions played in every round by his opponents.6 On the other hand, if
the underlying game is dynamic, assuming that players observe ex post only
the actions played by their opponents may not be enough to support the
convergence to a BNE. We would need to make the implausible assumption
that contingent plans (i.e., behaviour at counterfactual nodes) are fully ob-
served ex post.7 With these considerations in mind, we may want to adopt
a solution concept weaker than BNE.
Second, we want to stress that in the above cited studies, observability of
co-players￿preferences emerges as a necessary condition to sustain the evolu-
tive success of non-materialistic preferences only because it is assumed that
in every state of the evolutionary dynamics a BNE is played. Indeed, if pref-
erences are not observable, the correctness of conjectures about opponents￿
behavior implies that sel￿sh players (expected material payo⁄ maximizers)
will always obtain the highest possible material payo⁄. Consequently, they
will inevitably perform either the same or better in terms of ￿tness than the
nonmaterial utility maximizers.
We suggest that self-con￿rming equilibrium (SCE) is an appropriate so-
lution concept to describe the play in the relevant states of the evolutionary
5This is an implicit assumption in G￿th and Yaari (1992), Bester and G￿th (1998) and
Dekel, Ely, and Ylankaya (2007).
6Notice that under the assumption of private values, learning the probability of actions
would lead players to hold a common and correct belief about the play. By contrast, if we
had interdependent values (but this is not the typical case in the cited literature), learning
the probability of actions would not be enough. We would need to assume, for example,
that players have access to some public joint statistics on actions and preference types of
their opponents.
7Or you need to assume that long-lived and very patient players experiment enough
to learn their opponents￿strategies. On optimal experimentation, see, e.g., Fudenberg
and Levine (1993b). However, there are no studies which o⁄er general results on the
convergence of learning processes to Nash equilibrium.
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foundation, it is suitable to represent the stationary states of the adaptive
processes.8 We adapt to extensive-form games the version of SCE proposed
by Dekel et al. (2004), similar in spirit to the notion of conjectural equilibrium
proposed by Battigalli (1987) and Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997). Essentially,
the SCE describes situations in which players choose best replies to their con-
jectures about opponents￿play (rationality condition) and the information
on the actual play revealed ex post, after that the choices are made, does not
induce them to revise those conjectures, independent of whether they are
correct or not (conjectures￿con￿rmation property). The feature of a SCE
which matters here is that it allows situations where players hold heteroge-
nous beliefs about the strategies as long as these beliefs are not contradicted
by the evidence. From an adaptive perspective, we can justify such an equi-
librium situation by arguing that, by behaving di⁄erently, individuals with
di⁄erent preferences may accumulate di⁄erent experiences through the learn-
ing process (if they rely only on their own observations). In the next section,
we show that by weakening, in this sense, the assumption of correctness of
conjectures and allowing for individual learning, we gain further insights into
the evolution of nonmaterialistic preferences.
2 The indirect evolutionary model
2.1 The scenario
Consider a population composed of individuals with heterogeneous preference
types whose members interact with each other in pairs. Each player i can be
either an altruistic or a sel￿sh type, that is, for every i, ￿i = f￿;￿g, where ￿
means altruistic and ￿ sel￿sh. An altruistic type aims at maximizing the joint
(material) payo⁄, whereas a sel￿sh type aims at maximizing his own material
payo⁄. We de￿ne the material consequences of players￿actions with the
functions mi : Z ! R, i 2 N, where Z is the set of terminal histories. While
the utility of a sel￿sh player i coincides with his material payo⁄, Ui;￿(z) =
mi(z), the preferences of an altruistic player i are represented by utility
functions of the form: Ui;￿(z) = m1(z) + m2(z):
We denote q the measure of altruistic types in the population. We name
8On learning foundations of SCE in extensive-form games, see Fudenberg and Levine
(1993b) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1995).
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types is q. We do not make any explicit assumption on the players￿knowledge
of q: players might not have any clue of the distribution of preference types
in the population. Actually, they might not even be aware of the existence
of preference types di⁄erent from their own.
We assume that agents endowed with their speci￿c preference types and
beliefs are recurrently and randomly drawn to play a two-player dynamic
game with material payo⁄s (monetary payo⁄s). Suppose that each agent
may end up with probability 1
2 in the role of player 1 and 1
2 in the role of
player 2. Hence, the probability that an altruistic type is drawn to play in
the role of player i is exactly q, the measure of the set of altruists in the
population. We assume that players do not receive ex ante any signal about
their co-player￿ s preference type.9 Moreover, suppose that, after playing,
agents observe only the actions actually performed by their co-player. In
our scenario, this is equivalent to assuming that players observe ex post
the terminal history.10 We assume that in each round, given this information
structure and a preference distribution q, agents play a SCE of the underlying
game.
Generally speaking, a SCE describes a situation where (i) players best re-
spond to their (heterogeneous) conjectures about their opponent￿ s behavior
by maximizing their perceived expected utility, and (ii) the information re-
vealed ex post con￿rms their conjectures. To our knowledge, there is no study
that sytematically analyzes di⁄erent de￿nitions of this notion of equilibrium
according to the assumed scenario. Consequently, there is no o⁄-the-shelf
de￿nition which is appropriate for our context (i.e., a dynamic game with
incomplete information played recurrently with random matching). Hence,
it is worth de￿ning explicitly our version of SCE. Let Si denote the set of
strategies for player/role i. A pro￿le of strategies ￿i = (s￿i)￿i2￿i 2 S
￿i
i is a
9We make this assumption because this is the condition under which the negative result
of the previous papers obtains, given the assumption of a BNE play.
10Note that in our scenario, we do not assume that there is an ex ante stage where
players are ignorant about their preferences and form contingent plans of actions which
depend on the realization of their types (due to a chance move). Indeed, in our context, it
is more natural to assume that characteristics (i.e., types) are ￿xed for every agent. What
is random is the matching of individuals endowed with their own type. This matching is,
in turn, determined by the objective probability q, which measures the altruistic types in
the population. Hence, by observing the terminal history, players obtain (possibly partial)
information only about their opponent￿ s moves and not about their opponent￿ s preference
type.
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preference type ￿i. In each round, for any given pro￿le of behavioral rules
￿ = (￿1;￿2), the measure of altruistic types q induces a probability distrib-
ution over terminal nodes and thus a probability distribution over messages.
Call Z the set of terminal histories. We denote ￿(zjsi;q;￿j) the objective
probability that an agent playing in role i observes terminal history z 2 Z
when he plays si, the measure of altruistic types is q and the behavioral rule
for the other player/role is ￿j. We denote p(zjsi;￿i) the subjective proba-
bility of observing z as assessed by an agent playing in role i with beliefs
￿i 2 ￿(Sj). De￿ne ￿ : S1 ￿ S2 ! Z and call ￿(s) the terminal history
induced by the strategy pro￿le s.
De￿nition 1 A pro￿le of behavioral rules ￿ = ((s￿i)￿i2￿i)i=1;2 is a self-
con￿rming equilibrium if for each preference type ￿i 2 ￿i of each player
i 2 f1;2g we can ￿nd a belief ￿i;￿i 2 ￿(Sj) such that




ii) 8z 2 Z, p(zjs￿i;￿i;￿i) = ￿(zjs￿i;q;￿j):
The ￿rst condition states that each preference type chooses a pure strat-
egy which maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs (rationality con-
dition).11 The second condition states that for each preference type the
statistical distribution of observations over terminal histories generated by
the population composition and the moves of players must coincide with his
subjective probability distribution. That is, the empirical frequencies of ac-
tions as observed by any preference type must not induce that preference
type to revise his beliefs (con￿rmation condition).
Each SCE play determines the objective ￿tness of each preference type
involved in the game by means of the material payo⁄ obtained on average
by agents endowed with that preference type. We evaluate the evolution of
altruistic preferences by considering a replicator dynamics. Denote m￿(q)
the average payo⁄of preference types ￿ in a typical state of the evolutionary
dynamics where the fraction of altruists in the population is q. Call m(q) the
11In a dynamic game, one may strengthen the rationality condition by requiring that
agents￿maximizing also be conditional on unexpected information sets. But this does not
change the set of SCE outcome distributions. This modi￿cation may be relevant for the
analysis of rationalizable SCE￿ s, but it does not a⁄ect our example.
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fraction q with altruistic preferences equals the di⁄erence between the current
average payo⁄ of individuals with these preferences (m￿(q)) and the current
average payo⁄ in the population (m), that is:
dq
dt = [m￿(q) ￿ m(q)]q.
With this scenario in mind, we next discuss the example of the (three-
stages) Centipede Game. We consider an evolutionary dynamics where in
each state, given a preference distribution q, players play a SCE of the Cen-
tipede Game, given the ex post information structure speci￿ed above and
their beliefs about their opponent￿ s play in that state. We will show that
starting within a large subset of the simplex of all possible beliefs such an
evolutionary dynamics favors altruistic preferences.
2.2 The evolutionary Centipede Game





























Fig. 1. Centipede Game with monetary payo⁄s
Suppose that sel￿sh agents drawn to play in the role of player 2 attach
a small probability to action A0 being played conditional on (A;a), that
is, ￿2;￿(AA0jA) < 1=3 holds. Suppose that sel￿sh agents drawn to play in
the role of player 1 attach a small probability to action a being played by
12Notice that the numbers attached to the terminal nodes represent players￿material
payo⁄s (money) and do not necessarily coincide with their utilities.
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impose to the initial system of beliefs is that all sel￿sh individuals believe
that strategies AA0 and a are unlikely to be played.13 According to these
beliefs, sel￿sh agents who have to play in player 2￿ s role will choose d, while
sel￿sh agents who have to play in player 1￿ s position will choose D: We
do not have to impose any restriction to the system of beliefs of altruistic
types. Indeed, whatever their beliefs, given that they want to maximize
the expected joint payo⁄s, they will play "across" whenever it is their turn
to make a move (i.e., AA0 when they take player 1￿ s role and a-whatever
the strategy of player 1-when they take player 2￿ s role). In every stage of
the evolutionary dynamics, this pro￿le of behavioral strategies constitutes
a SCE of the basic game, given the system of beliefs speci￿ed above and
the assumption that players can observe ex post only the actions played by
their co-players. In fact, from a static perspective each preference type of
each player is maximizing his (perceived) expected utility, and given the ex
post information structure, none of them can revise their (possibly wrong)
beliefs about the equilibrium strategies of their opponent. In particular, in
any state q the correct probability of strategy a is exactly q. However, sel￿sh
types playing in the role of player 1 believe that the probability of a is very
small, that is, ￿1;￿(a) < 1
3, which is wrong in those states where q ￿ 1
3. By
playing D, they prevent themselves from realizing that a is actually more
likely than expected. Similarly, the true probability that strategy AA0 is
chosen by player 1 coincides with the probability that the type drawn to
play in player 1￿ s role is altruistic, that is, q. After A, A0 should be expected
with probability one. However, sel￿sh types in player 2￿ s role believe that A0
is unlikely and that by playing d, they cannot revise their wrong beliefs. From
an adaptive perspective, by sticking to playing "down" whenever they can,
sel￿sh players do not have the opportunity to learn the correct probabilities
of their co-player￿ s strategies. By contrast, altruistic types may end up in
equilibrium having a complete picture of the behavior of the opponent, but
the correctness of their beliefs is not an issue here. Given their preferences,
13Obviously, without such a restriction we would face a multiplicity of SCE￿ s, given
the ex post information structure. We motivate such beliefs by reasoning that agents do
not have access to any public statistics before playing. We could imagine that their initial
beliefs are based on introspection: since they do not have any clue of the average behavior,
they make the simple assumption that the opponent is likely to behave as they would
behave it they were in his shoes. Moreover, note that these beliefs are non-doctrinaire,
meaning that they attach positive probability to every possible terminal history.
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whatever their beliefs. Regardless of whether they learn the exact frequencies
of each action or not, they would behave altruistically anyway.
Notice that this SCE is also rationalizable, meaning that it is consistent
with rationality (i.e., consistent with conditionally expected utility maximiza-
tion), con￿rmation of conjectures and initial common beliefs in rationality
and con￿rmation of conjectures.14 It is immediately clear that when two
altruists, two sel￿sh types, or a sel￿sh type in the role of 1 and an altruist in
the role of 2 are matched, their SCE strategies and conjectures are consistent
with all these assumptions. Consider the match between an altruistic player
1 and a sel￿sh player 2. Given this match, the SCE path will be (A;d). After
A, the sel￿sh player 2, who (initially) believes in the rationality of player 1,
is allowed to hold arbitrary (conditional) beliefs about the subsequent move
of player 1. That is to say, the conditional belief that D0 is very likely (i.e.,
￿2;￿(AA0jA) < 1=3) is consistent with the (initial) belief of player 2 in the
rationality of player 1. Given this conditional belief and the rationality of
player 2, d follows A. By continuing to play in the same way and observing
ex post only the actions played, sel￿sh types learn the correct frequencies
of actions A and D. However, they are unable to infer that A0 follows A
with probability one. But if we were to assume that players can observe ex
post also the preference types of their co-player, the SCE pro￿le of strate-
gies described above would not be rationalizable. Indeed, if preference types
are observed ex post, the sel￿sh types could infer the correct frequencies
of strategies from the rationality assumption and the observed frequency of
preference types. This is why we adopted the general version of SCE pro-
posed by Dekel et al. (2004) applied to extensive-form games and not the
original notion of SCE introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1993a, 1993b).
In fact, in the latter version, the ex post information structure is such that
players can observe both the moves of the opponents and nature. But if this
is the case, then ex post observability of preference types is implied.
What is crucial in our example is that sel￿sh individuals do not learn
the exact frequencies of their co-players￿strategies but continue to expect
sel￿sh behavior. Because of their incorrect, but con￿rmed beliefs, they stick
14Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) introduce the concept of rationalizable conjectural
equilibrium for static games; Dekel et al. (1999) produce a version of this concept
for extensive-form games (rationalizable self-con￿rming equilibrium). See also Esponda
(2010), who provides an extension of Rubinstein and Wolinsky￿ s (1994) notion of rational-
izable conjectural equilibrium to games with incomplete information.
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perform worse than altruistic individuals.
Let us analyze how the share of altruists in the population evolves. Re-
call that the equation of the replicator dynamics is the following:
dq
dt =
[m￿(q) ￿ m(q)]q. We need to compute m￿(q), the average SCE payo⁄ of
an altruistic type, averaged across the roles he can take and across the pref-
erence types he can face. When an altruist faces another altruist (and this
occurs with probability q), with probability 1
2 he takes the role of player 1
and obtains 2, whereas with probability 1
2 he takes the role of player 2 and
obtains 4. When an altruist faces a sel￿sh agent (which occurs with prob-
ability 1 ￿ q), he obtains 0 whatever his role. Hence, the average payo⁄ in
the sub-population of altruists is: m￿(q) = (1
22 + 1
24)q = 3q. A sel￿sh agent
faces an altruist with probability q and obtains 1 when he takes player 1￿ s
role, whereas he obtains 2 when he takes player 2￿ s role. With probability
1 ￿ q he faces another sel￿sh agent and obtains 1 when he takes player 1￿ s
role and 0 when he takes player 2￿ s role. Thus, the average payo⁄ of a self-




20)(1 ￿ q): Consequently, we can
compute the average payo⁄ in the population, that is: m(q) = 2q2 + 1
2q + 1
2:
The dynamics of the share of altruists in the population is represented by the
following equation:
dq
dt = [m￿(q) ￿ m(q)]q =
￿
5




below represents the phase diagram for this dynamics.
Fig. 2. Phase diagram for the dynamics of the population share of
altruists.
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of altruists is high enough, i.e., q > 1
4 individuals with altruistic preferences
perform better than individuals with sel￿sh preferences, and they are able
to invade the whole population. Indeed, altruistic types fare well when they
meet other altruists because they reach the e¢ cient outcome and obtain a
high payo⁄. If this match occurs su¢ ciently often, they reproduce faster
than sel￿sh types (who never reach the e¢ cient outcome) and end up being
the only surviving preference type. More interestingly, Figure 2 and the
reasoning above tell us that a population of all altruists is not vulnerable
with respect to the injections of a small share of sel￿sh individuals.
It is worth noting that we did not make any explicit assumption on ex-
perimentation. We implicitly assumed that agents in every round maximize
their current (expected) utility, given their actual beliefs, and behave my-
opically, which implies that they do not implement any dynamically optimal
strategy to learn opponents￿behavior. Even if we allow for active learning,
it is not granted that agents learn the correct probabilities of opponents￿
strategies so that the steady state is a BNE. Suppose we have a population
of all altruists and we inject few sel￿sh types. It might be objected that if
sel￿sh agents in player 2￿ s role often experiment with action a, they might
realize that player 2￿ s strategy actually is to play A0 after a. A similar reason-
ing would apply to sel￿sh agents in player 1￿ s role: if they often experiment
with action A, they will eventually realize that action a is more likely than
expected. However, it is not clear how much patient they should be (i.e.,
how high their discount factor should be) in order to experiment frequently
enough with a (currently) suboptimal action and learn the correct probabili-
ties of their opponents￿strategies.15 Moreover, the system of beliefs of sel￿sh
agents, which supports the SCE described above, actually attaches positive
probability to actions A0 and a. Neverthless, given the heterogeneity of the
population, whenever one sel￿sh agent is matched with another, he observes
exactly what he expects. Hence, even with little experimentation, we could
justify the SCE described above as a steady state. If, for example, a sel￿sh
agent in the role of player 1 observes a when experimenting with A, he could
reason that the other player also experimented or simply made a mistake.
Notice that the SCE we considered is played throughout the evolutionary
15For optimal experimentation in extensive-form games, see Fudenberg and Levine
(1993b). They show that the steady states of an extensive-form game approximate Nash
equilibria if lifetimes go to in￿nity more quickly than the discount factor tends to one.
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system of beliefs of sel￿sh agents is never contradicted by ex post observa-
tions. However, notice also that, if, in a population of all altruists, we inject
sel￿sh agents endowed with another system of beliefs, it might happen that
a pro￿le of behavioral strategies which is a SCE in one state of the evolution-
ary dynamics is not a SCE in another state. For example, if we inject sel￿sh
types with beliefs ￿1;￿(a) ￿ 1=3 and ￿2;￿(AA0jA) ￿ 1=3, which support a
SCE where sel￿sh players play respectively AD0 and a, these types perform
better than altruists and their measure increases until the state q = 1=3 ￿ "
is reached. In this state, a switch to another SCE needs to occur since the
initial system of beliefs of sel￿sh agents could not be con￿rmed. However, in
order to characterize every possible evolutionary dynamics, given the initial
system of beliefs, we would need to introduce a speci￿c criterion to select a
SCE in every state (and to switch from one SCE to another). In particular,
we would need to be more explicit on the way agents form their (initial) be-
liefs and on how these beliefs evolve together with q. Such a general model
would be a worthwhile topic for future research.
3 Conclusions
The literature on the evolution of preferences has produced a common re-
sult: conditional on playing some (Bayes) Nash equilibrium in every state
of the evolutionary dynamics (when the preferences are ￿xed), only self-
ish individuals survive if the preference types are not observable. We have
shown that by adopting the weaker solution concept of SCE, which allows
for heterogenous beliefs across preference types, there is room for altruistic
preferences to evolve even if preferences are not observable. Hence, adopting
self-con￿rming equilibrium as a rule to pin down behavior in the stages of
the long-term evolutionary dynamics is promising, and, most remarkably, it
has a natural learning foundation.
It is worth pointing out that we selected a particular self-con￿rming equi-
librium and that, of course, there may be many other SCE￿ s for the same ex
post information structure. However, we allowed for a very large set of initial
beliefs imposing some restrictions only to the system of beliefs of sel￿sh types.
The restrictions we imposed are quite plausible nonetheless: sel￿sh players
believe that the opponent will behave in the same way as they would if they
were in his shoes. The implicit assumption is that they use introspection to
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Moreover, we assumed that in every state of the evolutionary dynamics,
players would play a self-con￿rming equilibrium as if they learned to play it.
That is, we did not explicitly model the short-term learning dynamics that
would lead to players playing that speci￿c self-con￿rming equilibrium. By
virtue of the fact that a self-con￿rming equilibrium can be typically learned
in an adaptive way, it would be instructive to analyze and describe the short-
term behavioral adaptation. Such an analysis would more extensively sup-
port the choice of self-con￿rming equilibrium as a rule for mapping prefer-
ences into behavior in the relevant state of the long-term evolutive process.
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